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INTRODUCTION
What drives judges to grant or deny standing, specifically taxpayer
standing under the Establishment Clause, as they do? Perhaps judges are
motivated by a deep reverence for the separation of powers, and see con-
stitutional and prudential standing as a straightjacket to keep courts with-
in their own sphere of authority.' Perhaps courts handcuff themselves to
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); Oxford Uni-
versity (B.C.L.); Harvard University (LL.M.). These reflections were prepared for a Symposium at the
Duquesne University School of Law held on November 3, 2011, on the subject of "The Future of the
Establishment Clause in Context: Neutrality, Religion, or Avoidance?" I am grateful to Bruce Ledewitz
for his kind invitation to offer my thoughts on the topic of taxpayer standing under the Establishment
Clause, and for the honor of sitting alongside the distinguished group of panelists he convened for this
important event. For their comments and criticisms in the course of our Symposium, I am pleased to
thank my fellow panelists and the engaged audience in attendance. It also gives me great pleasure to
thank Sean Baird, K. Adam Kunst, and Evan Williams for their suggestions in developing the ideas in
this paper.
1. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion ofPowers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983).
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the rules of standing so as to protect the integrity of the border separating
law from politics, recognizing that permissive standing rules create vast
space for courts to engage in deliberations that more closely approximate
the legislative function than the judicial one.2 Or maybe it is the good-faith
intention to begin from neutral principles in order to ultimately reach the
right jurisprudential result.3 We can posit each of these as the answer, or at
least part of the answer.
But perhaps the real answer is even more simple, and indeed more
troubling, than we might suppose. The Court's taxpayer standing rules
under the Establishment Clause have pressed Pamela Karlan to ask how
long the Court will continue to "manipulate standing rules to privilege
claims it values . . . and to defeat claims it dislikes." 4 Justice Brennan
himself advanced a similar line of argument quite forcefully while sit-
ting in the minority. He argued that the Court's hostility to the Fram-
ers' understanding of the Establishment Clause, as well as to the
Court's enforcement of that understanding, had led the Court to deny
standing as a way to "vent[] that hostility under the guise of standing, 'to
slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who as the Framers intended
are entitled to full consideration of their Establishment Clause claims on
the merits.' 5 We should therefore consider the possibility that judges
have misused the standing doctrine, 6 such that judicial decision-making
on taxpayer standing is motivated by nothing more than "naked politics." 7
Could the standing doctrine be merely a smokescreen that conceals the
political preferences of judicial actors? One recent study answered the
question in the affirmative, concluding that "judges provide access to the
courts to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agen-
das of judges." 8
2. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886, 888-89, 893 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions ofFederal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447,
454 (1994).
4. Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REv. 875, 882 (2010).
5. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Amns. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 513 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in result and dissenting)).
6. Michelle M. Huhnke, Standing and the First Amendment: A Preenforcement Challenge to
Child Pornography Forfeiture Laws, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1689, 1690 (1993).
7. Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon ofAcceptable Arguments,
47 EMORY L.J. 89, 149 n.310 (1998).
8. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1742-43 (1999).
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The charge, then, is both devastating and direct: that the Court
chooses whether to grant or deny standing according to what will serve the
ideological interests of the governing judicial majority.9 The Court, we
are told, manipulates the standing doctrine in order to make or avoid
substantive judgments,' 0 much like the Court is seen as having done in the
Burger era to align its rulings with the ascendant conservative strand of
constitutional law." On Mark Tushnet's analysis, "the Court finds stand-
ing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits and denies standing
when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached."' 2 In this way,
the Court has deployed standing as a Bickellian passive virtue,13 a de-
vice that allows the Court either to sidestep matters of moral controver-
sy or to grab hold of ones it wishes to engage. Whatever the Court's
motivation for granting or denying taxpayer standing under the Establish-
ment Clause, Bruce Ledewitz is right to observe that the Court's estab-
lishment case law is a collection of many missed opportunities to engage
in "genuine judicial statesmanship."' 4
In these brief reflections, I explore the connection among the found-
ing design of the Establishment Clause, its modern interpretation and re-
interpretation, and the doctrine of taxpayer standing. I argue that the crea-
tion and evisceration of the taxpayer standing doctrine under the Estab-
lishment Clause is the bridge that connects the Clause's founding design
with its modern incarnation, rendering the two more similar than we
might suppose. I begin with the colonial era and the early years of the
American republic, examining the intensity of religious faith at the found-
ing, which manifested itself in a pervasive culture of religious establish-
ment even after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. State establishments of
religion abounded, as did religious tests and restrictions. But the eventu-
9. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REv.
159, 171 (2011); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search ofJudicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Quali-
tative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 580-81 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 73, 126 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 347-48 (2004); Nancy C.
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613-14 (2004); William W. Buzbee, Standing and
the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 249 (2001); Patrick Lloyd Proctor, No
Generalized Grievances: The "Law of Rules" Approach to Standing, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 927, 945-
46 (1993); Peter H.A. Lehner, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Inaction, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 627, 648
n.134 (1983).
10. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-24 (1982).
11. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 635 (1985).
12. Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
663, 664 (1977).
13. David J. Weiner, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 227 (2001).
14. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM 144 (2011).
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al move toward disestablishment in the several states ultimately spurred
federal courts to create the taxpayer standing doctrine to conform Ameri-
can constitutional law to the new reality in the United States: that the mod-
em premise had shifted away from religious establishment and the fusion
of church with state toward pluralist democracy and the separation of reli-
gion from government.
I subsequently trace the development and demise of the taxpayer
standing doctrine. Its emergence is attributable to the same forces that have
since quickened its decline: the impulse to recognize the specialness of
religion and to grant a measure of autonomy in the choice to adhere, or not,
to religion. Courts were concerned that the effect of compelling a non-
adherent to support a religion, or religion period, would be to ascribe to
her beliefs that are not necessarily her own. In a good-faith effort to
establish a sanctuary for citizens and their beliefs, courts therefore
carved out a permissive exception for taxpayer standing from the custom-
arily uncompromising rules of federal standing. The consequence of en-
forcing these new rules governing taxpayer standing under the
Establishment Clause was to localize religious beliefs within the indi-
vidual and away from the several states, where it had been anchored at the
founding.
Yet more recently, as I later demonstrate, the taxpayer standing doc-
trine has come under pressure. It is now on the brink of falling into
desuetude. The modern decline of taxpayer standing has curiously de-
rived from the same heightened solicitude for religion, recognizing that
religion is special, and that the federal government should keep its hands
off. The result of this erosion of taxpayer standing has likewise been to
localize religion, though not exclusively within the individual. As I will
argue in the pages to follow, the regulation of religion and religious
belief are increasingly becoming localized within the several states. The
rise and recent erosion of taxpayer standing therefore have a similar impe-
tus and product. The implications of the argument I advance in these pages
are more provocative still: tle collapse of taxpayer standing could actually
have the consequence of returning the republic to the founding design of
the Establishment Clause.
I. RELIGION AND THE STATE
Whether the state should stand separate from religion, or integrate
itself with it, is a deeply contentious question of constitutional design.
It is in many ways the first and most difficult choice constitutional
designers must make before moving on to delineate the other dimensions
870 [Vol 87:3
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of the state's power and its relationship with citizens. Though many may
presuppose that Church and State should be separate, separation is not a
necessary condition of liberal democracy.' 5 We should therefore not be
surprised to see many variations on Church-State religions across the
globe. And we have. Some countries have adopted a fiercely separationist
approach, mandating an uncompromising division of religion from gov-
ernment. 16 Others have chosen the contrary approach, enthusiastically
merging religion into the state such that there may no longer be a discern-
ible distinction between their respective spheres of influence.' 7 But the
American experience has been unique. It has exhibited both separationist
and integrationist characteristics in its lived history. What is more, the
relationship between Church and State is today much different from what it
was at the founding, and it may yet evolve again.
A. Faith at the Founding
Early Americans were intensely religious. Though the colonists who
had left the Old World in search of a new one ultimately found religious
refuge in what would become America,18 their first actions were to estab-
lish deep bonds between religion and government in their respective col-
onies. Most of the early colonies adopted an official religion to which their
inhabitants were committed just as intensely as those who had driven them
from England had been committed to their own faith.19 Importantly, the
colonies identified with different religions and therefore reflected different
religious affiliations.20 Religious diversity among the colonies was there-
fore the norm, but religious diversity within the colonies remained un-
common. 21 The point, though, is clear: at the founding, religious
15. See Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and
the Autonomy and Generality ofPrinciples of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 647, 672-73 (1993).
16. See, e.g., 1958 LA CONSTITUTION art. I (Fr.); CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 1974, art. 288(c) (Port.); TORKiYE CUMHURiYETi ANAYASASI
[CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.).
17. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art.
149 (Afg.); CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIR Nov. 28,
1996, art. 178(3) (AIg.); QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 12 [1980] (Iran).
18. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Inter-
pretation, 62 TENN. L. REv. 899, 933 (1995).
19. MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 35
(1992).
20. LOREN P. BETH, THE AMERICAN THEORY OF CHURCH AND STATE 59-60 (1958).
21. CLIFTON E. OLMSTEAD, RELIGION IN AMERICA PAST AND PRESENT 27 (1961).
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establishments were, as Jed Rubenfeld demonstrates, "features of the
American landscape." 22
The adoption of neither the United States Constitution, nor even the
Bill of Rights, did much to change the establishmentarian disposition
among the several states. And one should not have expected much to
change either, because the Bill of Rights was not intended to disrupt the
state religious establishments at the time. Looking back to the actual politi-
cal practice of the day, the Establishment Clause "did not disestablish
anything," writes Michael McConnell, stressing the most important point
to appreciate about the Clause: "It prevented the newly formed federal
government from establishing religion or from interfering in the religious
establishments of the states." 23 The founding design of the Establishment
Clause is therefore more correctly understood as a federalism-reinforcing
device, intended to protect the states from the intrusive reach of the na-
tional government in matters of religion and to safeguard the sphere of
sovereignty belonging to states.24
Consider the religious establishments that existed at the founding,
some of which persisted even after the adoption of the Establishment
Clause and the larger Bill of Rights. Connecticut's 1776 Constitution
established Christianity as the governing faith25 and the state mandated a
religious test for office requiring a disavowal of Catholicism. 26 It was not
until 1818 that the state finally disestablished its state church. 27 The Mas-
sachusetts Constitution gave a preference to Protestantism, 28 a preference
which endured until 1833 when the state formally disestablished. 29 For its
part, New Hampshire established Congregationalism, 30 held fast to a
Protestant test for office,31 and did not disestablish until 1819.32 South
Carolina established Protestantism 33 and disestablished it in 1790.34
22. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really was Unconstitutional, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2347, 2351 (1997).
23. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Estab-
lishment ofReligion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2109 (2003).
24. Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate
Law?, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (2003).
25. CONN. CONST. of 1776 pmbl.
26. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A
Machine that Has Gone ofltself 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674, 681-83 (1987).
27. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 120 (1987).
28. MASS. CONST. art. Ill.
29. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 5-6 (2010).
30. Michael R. O'Neill, Government's Denigration of Religion: Is God the Victim of Discrimina-
tion in Our Public Schools?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 477, 525 n.380 (1994).
31. N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art I, § VI.
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But religious establishments are not the only way to exhibit a pref-
erence for religion or an antipathy for non-religion. State religious tests
are an equally effective way to signal an official position, and they did
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause in the early years of the repub-
lic. Although some states had no officially established religion after the
adoption of the United States Constitution, they nonetheless imposed reli-
gious tests for public office within the state. This is true of Delaware, 35
Georgia,36 Maryland,37 New Jersey, 38 New York, 39 North Carolina, 40 and
Pennsylvania. 41 As for Virginia, it was not until 1830 that its Constitu-
tion was amended to enshrine within it a proscription against religious
tests.42 The only state to neither establish a religion nor require a religious
test was Rhode Island,43 which was founded by Roger Williams, the great
defender of religious freedom."
That was the founding landscape of law and religion in early Ameri-
ca. The portrait actually becomes clearer if we examine the founding land-
scape from a higher level of abstraction. Looking at the whole of the
early American tradition of religion and government against the back-
drop of the lived experiences of the states as well as the constitutional text
itself allows us to uncover the three general signposts that informed the
founding design of the Establishment Clause: (1) national interdiction; (2)
congressional disability; and (3) state sovereignty. Let us understand these
three signposts as the three principles that stand at the very base of the
founding design of the Establishment Clause.
32. Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 BYU L. REV.
439,452 n.41 (1995).
33. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII.
34. Frederick V. Mills, Sr., Disestablishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION IN THE SOUTH 260,
261 (Samuel S. Hill et al. eds., 2005).
35. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII.
36. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI.
37. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (invalidating Maryland's religious test).
38. N.J. CONsT. of 1776, art. XIX.
39. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
58 (1996).
40. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII.
41. PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government for the Commonwealth or State of Penn-
sylvania § 10.
42. ABEL C. THOMAS, STRICTURES ON RELIGIOUS TESTS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LATE
REFORM CONVENTION 21 (1838).
43. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 425, 483 (1999).
44. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV.
455, 462-63 (1991).
2012] 873
CHICAGO-KENT LAWREVIEW
The Establishment Clause's first founding principle is prohibitory. At
the founding, the Clause constrained the actions of only the national gov-
ernment, not the states.45 Proof positive is the multiplicity of intimate
relationships between religion and government within the several states
even after the adoption of the Establishment Clause-relationships that
would have otherwise violated the Clause had it applied to the states. The
second principle in the design of the Clause is derivative of the first and
also disabling in the sense that it disempowers an institution from taking
action. The Establishment Clause did not prohibit the entirety of the na-
tional government from establishing a religion. It was only Congress that
was the target of the drafters of the Establishment Clause. This is evident
in the very language of the Clause: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion. ."46 Finally, the third principle that
lay beneath the founding design of the Establishment Clause is state sov-
ereignty. States were to retain the power to regulate matters of faith ac-
cording to their own local rules and conventions, undisturbed by the risk of
encroachment by the new national government. 47
National interdiction, congressional disability, and state sovereign-
ty-those, then, were the three principles that informed the design of the
Establishment Clause. Together, they created wide latitude for states to
manage the boundary between religion and government, such that some
states ultimately opted to erect a wall between the two while others chose
a more osmotic membrane that allowed close collaboration and inter-
change between them. While the Establishment Clause had forbidden the
national government, specifically the Congress, from cultivating too cozy
a connection to religion and religious institutions, the Clause had mandat-
ed no such proscription upon the states. Quite the contrary, the states re-
mained free to continue their own preferred practices as to the relationship
between religion and government. There were therefore two regimes gov-
45. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251 (1833) ("These amendments
[listed in the Bill of Rights] contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state
governments. This court cannot so apply them.").
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is also evident by inference from the religiously-inspired words and
deeds of the President of the United States and some Justices on the Supreme Court of the United
States, the two other branches in the national government. Early Presidents invoked Christianity in their
respective Inaugural Addresses, see, for example, John Adams, President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1797), at para. 12, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th centuryadams.asp; William Henry
Harrison, President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), at para. 24, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu1l9th-century/harrison.asp; James Buchanan, President, Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1857), at para. 19, available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres30.html, and a Supreme
Court Justice used a majority opinion as a forum within which to call America a "Christian nation," see
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
47. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1823 (2004).
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eming the constitutional law of religion and government: one for the na-
tional government and one for its state counterparts.
B. The Modern Premise
It was not until the incorporation of the Establishment Clause that the
American superstructure of law and religion changed as a matter of
constitutional law. Before then, the relationship between law and religion
was governed largely according to state-specific choices. Unconstrained by
the Establishment Clause, states could establish or disestablish, favor or
disfavor, fund or defund religion according to the will of their constitu-
ents and state political actors. 48 "In short," writes Akhil Amar, "the origi-
nal establishment clause was a home rule-local option provision mandating
imperial neutrality." 49 It was a hands-off rule that militated in favor of
state autonomy. But that changed-and quite dramatically-when the
Court cast aside the founding design in recognition of the new social and
political realities of modern America.
Beginning in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to interpret the Bill
of Rights as restricting not only the national government but also the sev-
eral state governments.50 The consequence of incorporating the Bill of
Rights against the states was to chip away at the independence they had
enjoyed in the founding regime, when they could not only regulate
matters of religion and religious belief but more broadly individual rights
and liberties like the freedom of association 51 and criminal defense pro-
tections.52 The Court's greater oversight of state law and political prac-
tice sprang from its growing concern about federalism as a rights
safeguard. Although federalism had originally been conceived as a struc-
tural protection for personal rights and as a guarantor of interstate plural-
ism, the twentieth-century Court began to see federalism as providing
insufficient protection for the nation's budding intrastate pluralism.
The defense of intrastate pluralism helps explain the Court's first
judgment, in 1940, to apply the First Amendment's religious protections to
the states. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court incorporated the Free
Exercise Clause against the States, holding that a state statute could not
48. H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion
with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB.. L. 203, 209-10 (1999).
49. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 246 (1998).
50. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
51. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
52. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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lawfully ban Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing religious pamphlets in
a residential neighborhood. 53 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts ex-
plained that the Fourteenth Amendment had brought the states within the
reach of the Bill of Rights and that the states could no longer take shelter
under the cover of state sovereignty to immunize their rights violations. 54
That was a critical point in the Court's decision. But the most important
statement appeared in the Court's justification for incorporating the reli-
gious liberties in the Bill of Rights against the states. Anticipating the
criticism that states should be free to regulate religion, as had been the
case under the founding design, the Court brandished its new argument of
pluralism as a reason why the Bill of Rights should temper state power:
"The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield
many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested
and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own
country for a people composed of many races and of many creeds." 55 The
Court therefore affirmed itself as the defender of individual rights, against
incursions by both the national government and the states.
The same theme reappeared when the Court incorporated the Estab-
lishment Clause. Everson v. Board of Education concerned a New Jersey
law that reimbursed parents for the cost of their children's transportation
to public schools as well as to private Catholic schools. 56 The plaintiff
challenged the law as a violation of the Establishment Clause because
it compelled him to financially support Catholicism through his tax dol-
lars.57 The Court disagreed, but still invoked the principle of pluralism
upon which it had relied seven years prior in Cantwell.58 The Establish-
ment Clause cannot tolerate a program that gives a financial preference to
one religion over another, wrote the Court, because that ignores the reli-
gious pluralism within the state of New Jersey.59 If it wants to respect the
Clause, New Jersey "cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mo-
hammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or
the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." 60
53. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
54. Id. at 303.
55. Id. at 310.
56. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Id. at 15-17.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
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Here, again, we see the Court's solicitude for the new reality of reli-
gious pluralism within states.
Intrastate pluralism, then, is what spurred the Court to reset the
balance of powers between the national and state authorities. In all types
of cases implicating religion and its establishment, the Court began to in-
sert itself as a protective shield between states and their citizens, where
there had once been nothing but state-level institutions to mediate the
boundary separating citizens from their state. With the Establishment
Clause as its sword and the defense of religious pluralism within states as
its purpose, the Court struck down state-mandated school prayer in public
schools, 61 Bible readings in public schools, 62 Ten Commandments' dis-
plays in public schools, 63 and prohibitions on teaching evolution in pub-
lic schools. 64 In the interest of religious pluralism, the Court also struck
down public subsidies for textbooks and salaries at religious schools 65 as
well as the erection of a nativity scene on public property.66 Amid the
Court's several invalidations, the Court also upheld many state laws that,
in its view, accorded with the new modem premise of religious pluralism. 67
II. THE SPECIALNESS OF RELIGION
Deep within the core of the Court's case law on religion is a convic-
tion that religion is special. 68 From the founding to today, religion has
commanded a deep reverence from the Court. And with reason, because
the founders intended religion to benefit from protections more robust than
those conferred upon other manifestations of thought and action.69 Indeed,
the special protection for religion is perhaps America's foremost constitu-
tional value,70 enshrined as it is in the very first words of the very first
amendment to the Constitution. Nowhere is the specialness of religion
61. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
62. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
63. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
64. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
65. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
66. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989).
67. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
68. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 14-34
(1985).
69. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CALIF. L. REv. 673, 676-77 (2002).
70. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 94 (1980).
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more evident than in the Court's development and dismantling of taxpayer
standing under the Establishment Clause.
Yet the rules of taxpayer standing are neither obvious nor reducible to
a clear and concise statement. Quite the contrary, the Court has itself rec-
ognized that "the concept [of standing] cannot be reduced to a one-
sentence or one-paragraph definition."71 Scholars have been more criti-
cal, one describing the Court's standing approach as "confused," 72 an-
other suggesting that the Court's "strange doctrine in this area need[s]
clarifying," 73 and still another decrying that "the Supreme Court's own
explanation of the [taxpayer standing] exception borders on gibberish." 74
What lies beneath these criticisms, however, is more than invective. It
is a legitimate grievance that taxpayer standing under the Establishment
Clause is anchored to what has evolved into something of a right that con-
cerns more government expenditures than religious liberty.75
Part of the Court's difficulty in promoting clarity in taxpayer standing
has been its own disquiet about the theory of standing that should govern
access to courts. Faced with three standing options before it-a public
rights model of standing where citizens may sue in the name of the larger
public interest, a private rights model which limits standing to those who
have suffered a personal injury, and a quasi-public model-the Court ulti-
mately chose the last one: a standing regime under which, as Andy Hessick
defines, "litigants no longer had standing only to vindicate their own, pri-
vate rights but also could sue to vindicate public interests." 76 Today, the
taxpayer standing doctrine blends both public and private rights because
taxpayer suits under the Establishment Clause rest on twin misgivings
about the government overstepping the boundary separating religion from
the state and also about personal liberties.77
But whether the Establishment Clause should invite the vindication of
both private and public rights is unclear. On one common view, a public
71. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464,475 (1982).
72. Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J.
561, 607 (1997).
73. Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from Religion: Two Cents on Madison's Three
Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 33 (2008).
74. Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 365, 370
(2006).
75. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach
to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 348 n.163 (1986).
76. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
294 (2008).
77. Donald L. Beschle, The Supreme Court's IOLTA Decision: Of Dogs, Mangers, and the Ghost
ofMrs. Frothingham, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 846, 876 (2000).
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endorsement or censure of a religion or of religion in general triggers the
rights of only the affected sub-class of individuals whose religion is disfa-
vored.78 For instance, where the state grants tax exemptions to parents
whose children attend Christian denomination private schools, only those
parents whose children attend non-Christian denomination schools could
be argued to suffer an injury, if indeed that treatment amounted to an
injury at all. According to the competing view, however, any govern-
mental effort to advance religion or indeed to hinder it implicates the
rights of all citizens, irrespective of their personal relationship to the fa-
vored or impugned religion. 79 For whether or not a person is an adherent
to the religion, or any religion, her status as either an adherent or a non-
adherent will be affected by the government's choice to involve itself in
religious affairs. In this respect, the right against a governmental estab-
lishment of religion is the paradigmatic public right that touches all per-
sons. And that is precisely what spurred the Court to give taxpayers special
access to federal courts for Establishment Clause violations.
A. The Rise of Taxpayer Standing
Taxpayer standing was prohibited before it was allowed. In the
Court's opening pronouncement on taxpayer standing, individuals were
denied the right to challenge federal appropriations in their capacity as
citizens required to pay federal taxes.80 On the theory that the plaintiffs
alleged injury was interchangeable with what any other taxpayer might
raise as an injury suffered on the same facts, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that a citizen could challenge a federal expenditure as violative of her
constitutional rights. This reflects the Court's prohibition against hearing
claims that challenge an alleged harm too diffuse to allow anything but
abstract review. The general rule holds that the Court refuses standing
"when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in a substantial-
ly equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." 81 The Court's initial
posture was therefore to refuse standing to a taxpayer insofar as she was
indistinguishable from her fellow citizens with respect to the interests she
claimed had been violated by federal expenditures.
78. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 346, 414 n.356 (2002).
79. See, e.g., Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts Can Learn from
Cahifornia's Taxpayer Standing, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2010); Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion
and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 839 (1998).
80. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487-99 (1923).
81. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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But the Court later created an exception to the rule against taxpayer
standing. Taxpayers are not all created equal, suggested the Court in Flast
v. Cohen, at least when federal expenditures implicate a taxpayer's reli-
gion and religious beliefs. 82 More broadly, the Flast Court sought to
give constitutional cover to an individual challenging a federal appropria-
tion that violates a constitutional provision-even though such a claim
might otherwise be disqualified as a generalized grievance. Unlike the
conventional rules of standing which require the claimant to prove that she
has suffered an injury that sets her apart from the larger community of
citizens, 83 taxpayer standing calls for no such showing under the holding of
Flast. Even though the claimant may not have been subjected to the coer-
cive force of the state and her religious observance may not have been
burdened, the Court's taxpayer standing policy grants her the right to stand
as a surrogate for the larger population that would object to the complicity
between religion and govemment. 84 In Carl Esbeck's view, the Flast
exception has constitutional merit because it is indispensable to the rights
preserved under the Establishment Clause.85
Flast involved a challenge to federal expenditures that plaintiffs ar-
gued were unconstitutionally subsidizing religious schools. Retreating
from its rule in Frothingham, the Court began to lay the foundation for
permitting religion-based taxpayer standing when it observed that there
exists "no absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers challeng-
ing allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs." 86
Given that the Flast plaintiffs sought to invalidate a congressional program
under the Establishment Clause, the Court granted them standing, though
not before articulating its nexus test, which all taxpayers requesting stand-
ing must satisfy.87 The test has two parts: first, the taxpayer must demon-
strate a rational connection between her status as a taxpayer and the
governmental action she seeks to invalidate; and second, the taxpayer must
establish what the Court called a "nexus" between her status as a taxpayer
and the alleged constitutional violation.88 To refine the point, the nexus
test applies only where Congress has exercised its taxing and spending
82. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
83. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
84. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power,
84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1998).
85. Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 78 MIss. L.J. 199, 212 (2008).
86. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101.
87. Id at 102.
88. Id.
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powers, not any other power delegated to it under Article 1.89 On the
facts of Flast, the challengers met the two-part test because the Estab-
lishment Clause's purpose, reasoned the Court, was to forbid the federal
government from taxing and spending to the benefit of religion.90
The doctrine of taxpayer standing is really about the vindication of
specific rights, in this case the right to religious freedom and the corollary
right to freedom from government establishments of religion. It transforms
the structural protection of the Establishment Clause that erects a barrier
between religion and government into an individual right against public
funding flowing to religious institutions.91 This makes eminent sense
from our vantage point now, looking back at the development of taxpay-
er standing. But the rise of taxpayer standing was not preordained in
America's constitutional unfolding nor does the constitutional text itself
even gesture toward it. All of which raises an important question: Why
did the Court deem it necessary to create an Establishment Clause excep-
tion to the standing rules?
There are two reasons why the Court created the Establishment
Clause exception to taxpayer standing. The first reason was the difficulty
the Court perceived citizens would have in meeting the general test for
achieving standing. And the second reason was the Court's inclination to
constitutionalize the specialness of religion. Back to the first, which is the
more obvious of the two, the underlying concern is that establishment
violations, like other far-reaching injuries, are generally too diffuse for a
challenger to meet the requirements of standing.92 Without the taxpayer
exception, there would have been no way for establishment challengers to
clear the high hurdle set by the Court's standing rules given the proscrip-
tioi on generalized grievances. Still, this does not explain why the Court
wanted to make possible establishment challenges as opposed to other
challenges that are barred by standing rules. The answer lies in the second
reason for the Court's taxpayer standing exception.
The real nub of the reason why the Court created the Establishment
Clause exception was to recognize the specialness of religion. In order to
grasp this point, it is necessary to understand the difference between what
Ira Lupu calls a polity principle and a rights principle.93 A rights princi-
89. See Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing Question
in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 55 (2006).
90. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
91. See Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 232 (2011).
92. See Gwendolyn McKee, Standing on a Spectrum: Third Party Standing in the United States,
Canada, and Australia, 16 BARRY L. REv. 115, 122 (2011).
93. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death ofSeparationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230, 235 (1994).
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ple, explains Lupu, is one that operates to limit court access to parties
whose own personal interests are triggered by state action. 94 Therefore, to
vindicate a rights principle, there must exist a strong connection among the
action, the right implicated, and the party to whom the right personally
belongs. In contrast, a polity principle can be enforced in court by per-
sons who are not directly impacted by the state action at issue.95 As Lupu
writes, "enforcement of polity principles through adjudication requires
assignment of enforcement rights to private attorneys general, i.e., to
those who lack a strong personal stake but nevertheless are sufficiently
committed to the cause that they will litigate aggressively on behalf of
structural concerns." 96
The Court's taxpayer standing exception is a polity principle pursuant
to which virtually anyone could challenge a governmental action thought
to violate the Establishment Clause, even if the state action had not com-
promised the claimant's own personal right.
To allow any citizen to raise an establishment claim-contrary to the
conventional rules of standing-is to signal quite emphatically that reli-
gion and religious claims are special. By creating the taxpayer standing
exception, the Court set religion apart from the other rights, freedoms, and
structures that are subject to the limitations against generalized grievances,
abstract review, and concrete and particularized injury-in-fact. True, the
Court has never foreclosed the possibility that taxpayer standing could
well extend beyond the Establishment Clause context.97 That could con-
ceivably undercut religion's claim to specialness. But that the Court has
not yet applied taxpayer standing to anything but the Establishment
Clause proves to us that the Court regards the freedom from establish-
ment differently from other constitutional protections, at least for now.
Whether the Court will shift on this question is anyone's guess.
B. The Erosion of Taxpayer Standing
Despite the Court's insistence that taxpayer standing remains a viable
vehicle for contesting the coziness of religion and government, 98 scholars
have reached a contrary conclusion. Today, writes one commentator,
94. Id.
9 5. Id.
96. Id.
97. Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause Train
Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 275 (2008).
98. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
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"taxpayer standing is as unsuccessful a way to challenge public accommo-
dation of religion as it was some eighty years ago in Frothingham."99
There is some truth to that criticism. Over the past thirty years, the
Court has gradually eroded the ground upon which the Flast exception
was built. But it has done so without dispossessing religion of the spe-
cialness in which Flast clothed it.
The first major blow to the doctrine of taxpayer standing came in
Valley Forge.00 The Valley Forge Court, according to Abram Chayes,
"went out of its way to strip Flast of any remaining generative poten-
tial." 0 1 The two cases reach such apparently contradictory results that
William Fletcher has remarked that "it should be clear that either
Flast or Valley Forge is wrongly decided." 02 At the time clearly divided
among themselves, the justices in Valley Forge began what may now in
retrospect be interpreted as a careful effort to delimit Flast.103 Whereas
Flast had authorized taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures that
conferred upon religious institutions the imprimatur of the government in
violation of the Establishment Clause, the facts in Valley Forge did not
persuade the Court that the same risk of entangling state with church
exists when the federal government grants land to a religious institu-
tion.104 The Valley Forge Court consequently denied standing to a citizen
who had objected to a congressional land grant to a religious college.105
The result in Valley Forge is important because it demonstrates the
Court's reluctance to expand, and indeed its effort to shrink, the Flast ex-
ception.106
A subsequent case did nothing to strengthen Flast. In Newdow, which
was an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of the Pledge of
Allegiance, the Court denied standing to a father who had sought to
bring a suit on behalf of his daughter.107 Although the plaintiff s claims
were grounded in the Establishment Clause-which would have presum-
ably placed him squarely within the realm of taxpayer standing, for which
99. Catherine M.A. McCauliff, Religion and the Secular State, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 31,48 (2010).
100. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982).
101. Chayes, supra note 10, at 12.
102. William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 268 (1988).
103. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge,
61 N.C. L. REV. 798, 819 (1983).
104. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
105. Id. at 490.
106. Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge ofAllegiance, 5 FIRST
AMEND. L. REv. 162, 179 (2006).
107. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
2012] 883
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the only exception recognized thus far is the Establishment Clause itself-
the Court did not even cite Flast. This is admittedly consistent with the
Court's earlier and later rulings involving taxpayer standing in which
the Court gave Flast little deference. Yet to not even gesture toward the
leading case in the subject matter area is unusual for the Court. Unless, that
is, the Court has carefully considered its omission. Perhaps at the time of
Newdow the omission could have been seen as an honest oversight. But
today, given the Supreme Court's rulings in the aftermath, it seems
something more was at play, namely the marginalization of the Flast rule.
The Court struck a more serious blow to Flast in Hein.108 Two jus-
tices, in a concurring opinion, took the view that the Court should
overrule the Flast exception.109 Imagine for a moment America without
the Flast exception. Were Flast overruled, the rule in Frothingham
would control whether taxpayers could bring their establishment claims to
federal court. Recall that Frothingham denies individuals the power to
challenge federal appropriations as violative of the Establishment Clause
in their personal capacity as citizens obligated to pay taxes to the
federal government. 0 The consequence of denying taxpayers the power
to sue in federal court under the Establishment Clause is to effectively
shield states from federal judicial oversight. In such a regime approximat-
ing the founding design of the Establishment Clause, states would con-
ceivably displace citizens as the proper plaintiffs. In a return to the
founding regime where the Establishment Clause is effectively de-
incorporated, Congress could not make any law establishing a religion.
And were Congress to pass a law affecting the right of states to establish
or not establish a religion, states could in turn file suit to vindicate their
freedom from congressional intrusion into their sovereign sphere.
But Flast has not yet been repudiated. Nonetheless, although the
Hein plurality did not expressly overrule Flast, it did limit the Flast rule
quite severely to a set of circumstances that in many ways belies the Flast
Court's intended application. Hein held that a taxpayer could not sue under
Flast to invalidate the White House's practice of using, at its discretion,
general Executive Branch appropriations to organize conferences in fur-
therance of the President's faith-based initiatives program.11' The basic
rule emerging from Hein is therefore that taxpayer standing does not
extend to a claimant wishing to challenge discretionary Executive ex-
108. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
109. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-99 (1923).
111. Hein, 551 U.S. at 605.
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penditures that violate the Establishment Clause, and instead applies only
to what was at issue in Flast: congressional expenditures, or expenditures
specifically authorized by Congress, that violate the Establishment
Clause.112
One could certainly defend the Court's distinction in Hein. But the
distinction cannot be anchored in Flast, where the Court rests it, because
Flast did not cite, nor even hint at, the difference between Executive
Branch and congressional expenditures.1 3 Quite the contrary, the Flast
Court spoke only of the "expenditure of federal tax funds,"ll 4 which would
capture expenditures by all branches of government. The animating theory
of Flast did not turn on where the government expenditures originated,
whether the legislative or executive branch. Instead, Flast articulated
plainly its disapproval of public dollars being used in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, which implicates tax dollars impermissibly spent
both by Congress and under the direction of the President." 5 Yet Hein
interpreted Flast otherwise, such that now it appears to be the case that
taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause is available only pur-
suant to an identifiable congressional appropriation, and that alone."16
The Court's most recent taxpayer standing case has only further en-
trenched the unfavorable disposition toward the Flast exception. In
Winn, the Court weighed the constitutionality of an Arizona law that af-
forded tax credits for private donations in support of School Tuition Or-
ganizations, which distributed those funds to private school students,
including some who attended religious schools.117 The Court denied stand-
ing to a group of Arizona taxpayers who argued that the law infringed up-
on the Establishment Clause.118 Yet the Arizona law had appeared to be a
state government analogue to the very facts that had been contested in
Flast: a taxing and spending provision authorized by the legislature dis-
burses public funds to religious institutions. Given that the plaintiffs were
taxpayers who could reasonably be argued to meet the two prongs of the
Flast test-a logical connection to the legislative taxing and spending
power and a nexus between the alleged violation and the taxpayers' inter-
112. Id. at 610.
113. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2010).
114. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
115. Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29-30
(2009).
116. See Gillian E. Metzger, Remarks of Gillian E. Metzger, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459,
462 (2009).
117. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
118. Id.
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ests-one could have expected the Court to grant standing. But it did not,
distinguishing Flast from this particular case on the theory that the mon-
ey being disbursed to religious schools came not from the public but rather
from private individuals, in contrast to the facts in Flast where the
money had been fully public. 19 In the aftermath of Winn, the rule of
taxpayer standing is narrower than ever before.
Though some of the Court's recent taxpayer standing cases may sug-
gest it no longer regards religion as special, 120 I think the contrary is
true. As we read in Newdow, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
recognizes that "[t]he Court has permitted government, in some instances,
to refer to or commemorate religion in public life."'21 Why? Because
"some references to religion in public life and government are the inevita-
ble consequence of our Nation's origins." 22 Yet "[t]hese references are
not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause .... [T]heir history,
character, and context prevent them from being constitutional violations at
all." 23 Justice O'Connor concluded with a tribute to the role of religion
in American life: "It would be ironic indeed if this Court were to wield our
constitutional commitment to religious freedom so as to sever our ties to
the traditions developed to honor it."124 Justice O'Connor expressed simi-
lar views in McCreary County v. ACLU, where she affirmed that the
Founders' reverence for "religion's special role in society" continues to
inform the Court's approach to religion.125
But it is the Court's taxpayer standing judgments themselves that
convince me religion remains special in its view. The Court's disman-
tling of the taxpayer standing doctrine is not without consequence, and
the Court recognizes that. When the Court created the taxpayer standing
doctrine, it was grounded in the Court's desire to grant autonomy to the
individual to choose or reject religion. The consequence of granting tax-
payer standing under the Establishment Clause was to localize religious
beliefs within the individual and away from the several states, where it
had been anchored at the founding. But the Court's recent retrenchment
on taxpayer standing-though it has likewise been anchored in the
Court's desire to give more autonomy to choose or reject religion-has
119. Id. at 1447.
120. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464,488 (1982).
121. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 37.
124. Id. at 44-45.
125. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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returned autonomy to the states, which now share it with the individuals
located within each of the several states. We may therefore see the emer-
gence of a state-specific menu of establishment rules. This is a different
way of recognizing the specialness of religion: it projects the view that
religion and religious belief are better protected by the states, which can
speak directly and differently to their respective communities, rather than
by the national government, which cannot accommodate state-specific
religious sensibilities as efficiently or effectively as a state-centric Estab-
lishment Clause.
III. THE REDISCOVERY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The erosion of taxpayer standing has provoked observers to proclaim
their disapproval with the Court's recent turn against granting standing in
Establishment Clause cases. One critic has described the Court's distinc-
tion of Hein from Flast as "far from persuasive,"126 another as "unprinci-
pled and unsustainable,"127 and still another as "fatuous."1 28 This is a
difficult charge to neutralize for a Court whose transparent effort to
pinch down upon the taxpayer standing doctrine has been understood as
"further muddl[ing] an already unclear taxpayer standing doctrine." 29
These charges may be right but they do not fully explain what lies beneath
the Court's constitutional law. To understand the Court's taxpayer standing
case law requires us to draw equally from constitutional law as from con-
stitutional politics. Only then may we uncover what could be the Court's
jurisprudential ambitions: returning to the founding design of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
A. The Path to De-Incorporation
The slow march toward the de-incorporation of the Establishment
Clause may have paradoxically begun with its incorporation. In Everson,
the Court applied the Establishment Clause against the states, finally
bringing the state governments into conformity with the standards set by
the Constitution. 130 Interestingly, Everson had been from the beginning a
126. Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and How It Grows, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV.. 391,400 n.36 (2010).
127. Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 1083
(2009).
128. Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 431 (2007).
129. Lauren S. Michaels, Recent Development, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation:
Sitting This One Out-Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Funding, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 213, 233 (2008).
130. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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case about taxpayer standing, but the Court chose not define it in those
terms. 131 This is surprising given that the Court itself wrote in its judgment
that "[t]he appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a
State court challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents of
parochial school students."' 32
Nonetheless, the Everson Court's ruling created a path dependency
that may help explain where we are today on taxpayer standing. The
relevant facts of Everson bear remembering: a New Jersey statute author-
ized travel reimbursements to parents of children attending public and
private Catholic schools.133 In reaching its judgment, the Court reasoned
that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach."l 34 This powerful line of reasoning would lead most read-
ers to conclude that the Court invalidated New Jersey's reimbursement
program, particularly given that the state had chosen to reimburse only
Catholic schools among eligible private schools to the exclusion of other
private denominational schools. But the Court concluded otherwise, some-
how reasoning that "New Jersey has not breached [the wall of separation]
here." 35 The great irony in Everson is the Court's proclamation that states
were henceforth bound by the strictures of the Establishment Clause yet,
on these particular facts, the Clause did not apply.
Everson was a peculiar case. On the one hand, Everson marked a win
for those who believe in the separation of church from state insofar as
the reach of the Establishment Clause was expanded to the states. That is
of course the consequence of incorporating the Establishment Clause in the
Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause onto the states. It requires,
at least nominally, the same degree of separation between religion and
government at the state level as the Bill of Rights commands at the na-
tional level. On the other hand, though, that the Everson Court upheld the
New Jersey law was also a triumph for those who champion state sover-
eignty. New Jersey's prerogatives were shielded against invalidation at the
hands of national institutions and compulsions. This raises an important
question: Why did the Court resolve Everson in this way, giving a partial
victory to both separationists and state sovereigntists? The answer returns
us to the founding design of the Establishment Clause.
131. Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776-1786, 7 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 51, 60 (2009).
132. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
133. Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id.
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Recall that the founding design of the Establishment Clause was
national-centric. The Clause, as originally designed and interpreted, con-
strained the actions of only the national government, not the states. Incor-
poration changed that, causing the Establishment Clause to constrain the
actions of both the national and state levels of government. But there
was a collision between old and new in the transition from the founding
design of liberty to the modern premise of pluralism. It was difficult for
the Court to shed its pre-incorporationist skin, pursuant to which it grant-
ed great deference and wide latitude to states. This theme is echoed in
the Court's own words in Everson when it states, in the same breath, that
the New Jersey law must be measured against the "limitations imposed
by the First Amendment,"1 36 but that the Court must be careful to "not
strike that state statute down if it is within the state's constitutional
power even though it approaches the verge of that power." 37 The Court's
equivocal statement of the law should not arouse criticism; it should instead
invite understanding about the Court's difficulty in transitioning the re-
public from an Establishment Clause oriented toward only the national
government to one that would also oblige the states.
Since Everson, the fate of the incorporated Establishment Clause has
gone from uncertain to just about dead. Here is why: the three general
signposts that informed the founding design of Establishment Clause prior
to the Clause's incorporation are now true once again. National interdic-
tion, congressional disability, and state sovereignty-these three principles
have resurfaced as the organizing logic that gives the rules of taxpayer
standing under the Establishment Clause their basic structure.
Consider the present status of each of these principles in turn, begin-
ning with national interdiction. Remember that the first principle of the
Establishment Clause's founding design is prohibitory, meaning that it
restricts only the national government, not the states. The dissent in Winn
explains to us why this is so, noting although the national government
is barred by the Establishment Clause from subsidizing religion and reli-
gious institutions through the tax system, 138 no similar constraint applies to
the state governments: "From now on, [a state] government need follow
just one simple rule-subsidize through the tax system-to preclude
taxpayer challenges to state funding of religion."1 39 Indeed, continues the
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id.
138. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1462 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id. at 1450.
2012] 889
CHICAGO-KENT LA WRE VIEW
dissent, under the current rules of taxpayer standing, a state could grant a
tax credit to individuals who purchase a crucifix, and no federal court
could grant standing to an individual to challenge the state's action. 140 This
approximates what governed under the founding design of the Establish-
ment Clause. Then, states had nearly free reign to help or hinder and
promote or frustrate religion without worrying about citizens taking to
the federal courts for relief. That appears to be the case-or if the trend
continues, it may soon be the case-under the rules of taxpayer standing.
The second principle of the founding design of the Establishment
Clause is congressional disability. The important point here is that the Es-
tablishment Clause did not prohibit the whole of the national government
from establishing a religion. It applied only to Congress. That was then.
Today, Hein intimates a possible return to this second principle. Hein, of
course, involved general Executive Branch appropriations in support of
religion and religious institutions in connection with the program on
faith-based and community initiatives. The Court sanctioned those ex-
penditures precisely because they were executive expenditures, and not
congressional ones. Indeed, the Court cautioned expressly that Congress
could not constitutionally get away with the same kind of activity because
Congress is subject to rules that differ from the ones that constrain other
federal actors, namely the President and other executive branch officers. 141
This point is even narrower still. The modem Court has interpreted
taxpayer standing so as to restrict access to the judiciary only to challeng-
es against congressional establishments of religion when Congress acts
pursuant to its taxing and spending powers.142 The exchange between
Justice Stephen Breyer and Solicitor General Paul Clement at the Supreme
Court oral argument in Hein is worth examining on this score. Would a
taxpayer have standing, Justice Breyer asked the Solicitor General, if
"Congress passes a statute and says in every city, town, and hamlet, we
are going to have a minister, a Government minister, a Government
church . . . dedicated to the proposition that this particular sect is the true
sect .... "143 The Solicitor General answered no, perhaps feeling under-
standably constrained by his uncompromising position that taxpayer stand-
ing exists only where Congress acts under its taxing and spending power
to direct funds to religious institutions.144 But the Solicitor General's dis-
140. Id. at 1457.
141. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 595 (2007).
142. Id. at 604.
143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17-18, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587 (2007) (No. 06-157).
144. Id. at 18.
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comfort is perhaps misplaced because the modem trend appears to support
his view.
Finally, state sovereignty is the third principle in the founding design
of the Establishment Clause. Yet it may also be the formative principle
today as the Court continues to chip away at the taxpayer standing doc-
trine. State sovereignty holds quite simply that states have determinative
authority in the resolution of local problems, free of incursions by the
national government. Just as the first two principles of the Clause's found-
ing design appear to have resurfaced today, we notice a similar develop-
ment for this third principle of state sovereignty. According to the Winn
dissent, the case "offers a roadmap-more truly, just a one-step instruc-
tion-to any [state] government that wishes to insulate its financing of
religious activity from legal challenge." 45 Specifically, "[s]tructure the
funding as a tax expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way. No tax-
payer will have standing to object." 46 And what will be the consequence?
The dissent laments that, from now on, "[h]owever blatantly the [state]
government may violate the Establishment Clause, taxpayers cannot
gain access to the federal courts."147
Given these recent cases-not to mention Newdow's positive words
about the place of religion in American civil societyl 48-it may well be
that the next generation of Establishment Clause case law will resemble
the landscape prior to incorporation, characterized by three principles: na-
tional interdiction, congressional disability and state sovereignty.
B. The Nonjusticiable Establishment Clause?
The de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause could portend a
new, perhaps laudable, judicial approach anchored in deference to state
legislative choice. That may be what Chief Justice Rehnquist had in mind
from the very beginning.149 Writing in Valley Forge, Chief Justice
Rehnquist declared that "federal courts were simply not constituted as om-
budsmen of the general welfare."150 Rehnquist appreciated that the Valley
Forge plaintiffs had strong misgivings about what appeared to be a close
145. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1462 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35-40 (2004) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
149. See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme
Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 93, 125 (1996).
150. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464,487 (1982).
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relationship between religion and government, but ultimately ruled on
behalf of the Court that the plaintiffs' emotional discomfort was insuffi-
cient for standing: "It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but standing
is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his
advocacy."' 5' In Rehnquist's closing words in the majority opinion, he
stressed that the Court should not take on the role of social engineer and
depart from the narrow judicial role envisioned in the Constitution: he
wrote that he was "unwilling to countenance such a departure from the
limits on judicial power contained in Art. III."152 Rehnquist's position has
drawn significant criticism. 153 But it may nonetheless contain much to ad-
mire.
Let us remember from where springs the impetus to interpret standing
rules narrowly. As the Court wrote in Newdow, "[t]he standing require-
ment is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind
of government."l 54 It is part of a larger effort to move the judiciary toward
deferring more readily to legislative choice. What underpins this effort is
the theory of judicial minimalism, which holds that courts should decide
matters of moral contention and social division on the narrowest possible
procedural grounds so as to trigger legislative and popular deliberation on
those matters. 155 There is great wisdom in cultivating a norm of judicial
minimalism. It derives from what should be seen as an uncontroversial
observation: that courts are less well institutionally equipped than legisla-
tures and citizens themselves to express social, cultural and political values.
But it would be a mistake to associate exclusively with conservatism
the posture of judicial deference to legislative choice. Though conservative
constitutionalists typically favor a practice of judicial restraint, they are not
alone; many prominent progressive constitutionalists likewise endorse
judicial restraint bolstered by corollary theories of popular constitutional-
ism.156
151. Id. at 486.
152. Id. at 490.
153. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
155. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
156. See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional Reform in
the Spirit of the Bill ofRights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 180 (2002).
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The agreement does not stop at the academy, either. For proof, we
may look to the far-from-conservative Obama Administration, which has
in fact endorsed judicial restraint in taxpayer standing, most recently in a
brief arguing against granting standing to the Winn plaintiffs and, failing
that, urging the Court to uphold the impugned law in Winn.157 There are
therefore important continuities between conservatives and progressives
when it comes to taxpayer standing. Nevertheless, it is difficult to counter
the argument that the last decade has been anything but a victory for con-
servative constitutional interpretation on taxpayer standing. 15 8
Consistent with the practice of judicial restraint, the modern Court
may well have essentially adopted nonjusticiability as a rebuttable pre-
sumption for taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause. The
Court's taxpayer standing cases-Newdow, Hein, Valley Forge, Winn-
all appear to tell a story about the Court's "unwillingness to police official
statements or government ceremonies that would otherwise be susceptible
to the Court's stated Establishment Clause principles."1 59 That has been
the consequence of the Court's push for a return to the founding design of
the Establishment Clause. National interdiction, congressional disability,
and state sovereignty-together, these three signposts of the Clause's
founding design will effectively render inoperative the Establishment
Clause at the federal level. Here is why: federal courts, as bound by Su-
preme Court precedent, will grant standing only to the currently constricted
range of cases in which plaintiffs claim that Congress has acted pursuant to
its taxing and spending powers to favor or disfavor religion. If the Court's
current trajectory on taxpayer standing holds, all other cases will be dis-
missed for lack of standing, and therefore as nonjusticiable. This leaves
very little room for a federal judicial role.
Justice Kagan, in Winn, objected quite passionately to the Court's
new position on taxpayer standing. On her reading, too, the Court's cur-
rent taxpayer standing case law suggests that it will hear very few Estab-
lishment Clause challenges. Writing in dissent, Justice Kagan expressed
her fear that "the Court's arbitrary distinction [between appropriations and
tax expenditures] threatens to eliminate all occasions for a taxpayer to
157. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., The Supreme Court 2009 Term Overview and 2010 Term Preview,
27 TOURO L. REv. 33, 52 (2011).
158. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Supreme Court Review-Foreword, 44 TULSA L. REV. 467,
467-68 (2009); Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should
Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REv. 651, 653, 663-64 (2008). But see
Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. Rev.
983, 998 (2008).
159. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV.
583, 601 (2011).
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contest the government's monetary support of religion."o60 She further
observed, with palpable lament and deep regret, that federal courts will
henceforth be foreclosed as an avenue for a taxpayer to seek redress for
unconstitutional establishments of religion: "Today's holding therefore
will prevent federal courts from determining whether some subsidies to
sectarian organizations comport with our Constitution's guarantee of reli-
gious neutrality." 61 Justice Kagan is absolutely correct in her analysis of
the consequences of the Court's taxpayer standing case law. But those
consequences are not necessarily harmful.
True, federal courts may soon become-if they are not already-a
dead-end for a taxpayer hoping to pursue an Establishment Clause claim.
But that is not, nor has it ever been, the only avenue for a taxpayer
seeking relief on Establishment Clause grounds. There have always
been two other points of entry for a displeased taxpayer, and those would
remain open to taxpayers even if Justice Kagan's prediction comes true.
The first is the system of state courts; and the second is the electoral
process. On the first point, it has always been true that a state taxpayer
can petition her state courts for relief when the state violates her right to
non-establishment or her right to religious freedom. State constitutions
protect both of these rights. 162
That is an effective way for a state taxpayer to vindicate the rights she
argues she ought to enjoy. Second, though, a state taxpayer always re-
160. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original).
161. Id at 1451.
162. The vast supermajority of states prohibit religious establishments. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 3;
ALASKA CONST. § 1.4; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4;
COLO. CONST. art. I, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 7;
KY. CONST. § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; Miss.
CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. 1-4; N.H.
CONST. art. 6; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, §
15; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONsT. art. I, § 19. Similarly, an equally vast number of states
protect the right to religious freedom. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 3; ALASKA CONST. § 1.4; ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 25; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art I, § 4; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 3; DEL. CONST. art I, § 1; GA. CONST.. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art I, §§ 2-4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights § 7; KY. CONST. § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, §
5; NEB. CONST. art. 1-4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H.
CONST. art. V; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST. art II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 7; OR, CONST. art. I, §§ 2-4; PA. CONST. art. I § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, §
2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4;
VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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tains the right to express her grievances with her ballot. The electoral
process is the most direct way for a state taxpayer to right a wrong she
believes has been committed by those elected to act in her name. The
United States Supreme Court has long recognized this point:
Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction
does not impair the right to assert [] views in the political forum or at
the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional
electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens
convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected repre-
sentatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.163
So perhaps we should not fear the de-incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause as much as some might suggest. Taxpayers would still
have at their disposal a number of avenues to pursue their claims
against the government, both at the state level where public actors vio-
late state constitutional provisions and at the federal level where Congress
acts pursuant to its taxing and spending powers in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Furthermore, de-incorporating the Establishment Clause
could have salutary consequences for the standing of the federal judiciary
insofar as it would encourage federal courts to limit themselves to narrow
pronouncements and to avoid sweeping statements that redesign the law in
ways that "result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress'
power to change."l 64 That would be the undesirable result of a federal
court exercising its judicial power and casting itself "in the role of a Coun-
cil of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the
behest of anyone who disagrees with them." 165 Were the Court to take
that route, its insistence of serving as a court of general jurisdiction
would "undermine public confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the
Judiciary,"l 66 to the detriment of the tripartite balance of powers that
should govern the institutional structures of constitutional law.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, de-incorporating the Estab-
lishment Clause would be consistent with the project of cultivating a norm
of judicial minimalism. To limit the role of federal courts is not to pinch
down on civil and political rights nor is it to express a preference of
majoritarianism for the sake of itself. Rather, it is to decentralize the gates
of decision-making, removing the stranglehold the center currently enjoys
and to disperse across the state and to their citizens meaningful tools of
163. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
164. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (majority opinion).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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self-reflection and the fundamental power of self-definition. To situate the
locus of authority in federal institutions without recognizing the diversity
of views and sensibilities that governs across the land in the several states
is to do a terrible disservice to our aspiration of creating a culture of active
citizenship. Were federal courts to dismiss the counsel of self-restraint
and zealously expand the standing doctrine rather than shrink it as they
are currently doing,167 they would risk short-circuiting or preempting im-
portant deliberative processes between citizens and their elected represent-
atives and among citizens themselves. Those processes are critical to
building public citizens who find fulfillment in popular engagement
with fundamental questions of community and self-definition, of which
religion is perhaps the most important of all.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional law makes most sense when we appreciate the consti-
tutional politics behind it. Standing alone, the law of taxpayer standing
appears confusing and confused because it suggests that the Court is not
committed to any baseline constitutional principles. But when we view the
law of taxpayer standing against the larger backdrop of the evolution of the
Establishment Clause from the founding to today, we can more clearly
perceive what the Court appears to be pursuing as a matter of constitution-
al policy: a return to the founding design of the Establishment Clause. At
the founding, the Establishment Clause constrained the actions of only the
national government, disabled only Congress from establishing a reli-
gion, and vigorously protected the sovereignty of states. The Court's un-
folding Establishment Clause taxpayer standing case law suggests that each
of these three signposts-national interdiction, congressional disability, and
state sovereignty-may yet again soon hold true.
Perhaps we are correct to conclude that the Court is slowly de-
incorporating the Establishment Clause. After all, the membership of the
current Court does not seem inclined toward the modem Establishment
Clause. Two justices would undo much of the current establishment case
law, two would ease the restrictions on the interrelationship between reli-
167. One scholar, for example, suggests expanding the First Amendment freedoms of religious
institutions and concurrently broadening taxpayer standing to allow persons "to enforce the Estab-
lishment Clause precisely to preserve and maintain the integrity of religious entities as sovereign
spheres." See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 130 (2009).
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gion and government, and one looks particularly favorably upon the role
of religion in public life.168
To be fair, though, skeptics might suggest that the Court does not re-
ally have in mind the de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause when it
cultivates deep confusion about taxpayer standing. Were the Court actual-
ly committed to de-incorporating the Establishment Clause, it could just
declare it to be so, quite clearly and forthrightly, heeding the admonition
one of its own members has often articulated. 169 Other alternatives exist:
the Court could choose to finally bring clarity to taxpayer standing by
either permitting generalized grievances or finally overruling Flast alto-
gether. 170 Or, according to one scholar, the Court could tell us what is
really driving its decisions in taxpayer standing cases and elsewhere: find-
ing ways to discourage litigation in federal courts. 171 All of these are legit-
imate possibilities. But I suspect the answer is our initial hypothesis-the
current court is pulling the nation back to the founding design of the Es-
tablishment Clause.
What does the future hold for the Establishment Clause? If it does
indeed become de-incorporated for all intents and purposes, the conse-
quence will be to return the United States to the state of affairs that gov-
erned at and around the founding, when the Establishment Clause
constrained only what the national government could do. That development
would visit a number of changes to the structure of constitutional protec-
tions for religious liberty under the United States Constitution. The most
obvious change-and perhaps for most observers, also the most troubling
one-would see states freed to govern matters of religion within
their respective borders and according to their own state constitutional
rules. What is more, with the de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause,
states would no longer be bound by the rule preventing them from passing
laws establishing a religion. We should of course be worried about the en-
trenchment of this new zero in the relationship between religion and state
government. But it is not clear that we should consequently fear the disso-
lution of religious rights and liberties.
168. Stephen A. Newman, From John F. Kennedy's 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian Suprema-
cy: Religion in Modern Presidential Politics, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 691, 714 (2008).
169. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 597 (2002).
171. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV.
325,342 (2009).
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